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Résumé / Abstract 
 
La crise de la responsabilité civile des années 70 a mené à la création d’un nouveau type de 
contrat d’assurance qui avait pour but, selon Doherty (1991), de réduire le risque systématique 
associé aux polices d’assurance à longue durée. Ces contrats CMR (Claims-Made and Reported) 
ont obtenu la faveur du public dans les années 80 particulièrement pour ce qui est de l’assurance 
de la responsabilité civile des professionnels de la médecine. Nous présentons ainsi une étude de 
la  structure  et  de  la  performance  de  l’industrie  de  l’assurance  de  la  responsabilité  civile  des 
professionnels de la médecine en mettant en relief les deux types de contrats dans ce marché. La 
question à laquelle nous voudrions ultimement répondre est la suivante : pourquoi dans le marché 
de l’assurance de la responsabilité civile des professionnels de la médecine retrouvons-nous les 
deux types de contrats alors qu’un seul type est généralement offert dans les autres marchés? 
 
Mots clés : assurance de la responsabilité civile des professionnels de la 




The liability crisis of the 1970s led to the introduction of a new type of insurance policy designed, 
according to Doherty (1991), to reduce the un-diversifiable uncertainty associated with writing 
long-tail liability lines. These new claims-made and reported policies gained favor in place of the 
traditional occurrence coverage in the early eighties not only in medical malpractice, but also in 
the general liability arena. Under occurrence coverage, a loss incurred in a given year is covered 
by the contract for that year, regardless of when the claim is reported. In contrast, a claims-made 
policy pays only the claims reported in the policy year. Our paper presents a structure, conduct, 
and performance analysis à la Joskow (1973) of the medical malpractice insurance industry by 
focusing on the differences between the two contracts. The main question we want to address is 
why there are two types of contracts that cover the same risk exposure in the medical malpractice 
insurance industry whereas in other lines of insurance, only one exists primarily. 
 
Keywords: medical malpractice insurance, industry structure and performance 
analysis, claims-made contracts. 
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1. Introduction 
The  medical  malpractice  insurance  industry  has  been  one  of  the  most  scrutinized 
industries  in  recent  years.  Periodic  performance  “crises”  –  evidenced  by  increasing 
premiums  and  reduced availability of  liability  coverage  –  have  prompted  a  variety of 
legislative responses including, for example, legal reforms and the implementation of 
state victim compensation funds. Amid ongoing concerns for the rising cost of health 
care and an increase in the number of uninsured individuals for health care services, it is 
not surprising that medical malpractice insurers‟ operations are called to question; to the 
extent that higher premiums or non-renewal of coverage causes health care providers to 
reduce or discontinue services, patients‟ access to care is disrupted.
1  
Attempts to explain problems in the medical malpractice insurance industry typically 
examine the influence of exogenous factors on the performance of the member insurers. 
These exogenous factors include increased litigation by patients, increased jury verdicts 
and out-of-court settlements, falling investment income, rising reinsurance rates,  and 
changes in the legal environment. Interestingly, researchers have devoted little attention 
to developments within the industry and their potential influence on insurer performance. 
One such development was the introduction of  claims-made  policies in place of the 
traditional occurrence coverage in the mid-1970s.
2  
The traditional insurance contract is occurrence-based, wherein a policyholder is insured 
for  losses that are incurred during the insurance policy year, even if the loss is not 
reported for many more years.  In contrast, a claims-made insurance contract insure s 
policyholders for only those losses that are reported during the policy year even if the  
loss was incurred many years before (subject to a retrospective date or time limit). 
Touted as a way to reduce the uncertainty associated with writing long -tail liability lines 
(including the uncertain legal environment as in Doherty, 1991) , claims-made policies 
                                                 
1 A GAO (2003) report of four states cites mixed evidence that increasing malpractice premiums 
are related to physician supply. 
2 See Posner (1986) for a discussion of developments and organizational changes in the medical 
malpractice  insurance  industry  for  the  period  1970 -1985.  These  developments  include  the 
establishment of state-sponsored joint underwriting associations (JUAs) and the formation of 
physician-owned mutuals, reciprocals, and risk retention groups (RRGs).    2 
gained favor not only in medical malpractice, but also in the general liability arena (Sloan, 
Bovjberg and Githens, 1991). One major medical malpractice insurer, St. Paul Fire and 
Marine,  switched  its  entire  book  of  business  to  claims-made  in  the  1980s.  By  1984, 
claims-made  policies  accounted  for  fifty  percent  of  total  premiums  written  in  medical 
malpractice, and Posner (1986) predicted that “further growth of up to seventy to eighty 
percent  is  extremely  likely  during  1985”  (p.45).  Yet  our  data  indicate  only  partial 
movement by insurers to claims-made policies, and nearly 25 percent of insurers today 
still write only occurrence based policies.  
In  our  study,  we  examine  firm-level  variation  in  the  use  of  claims-made  versus 
occurrence  policies  in  a  national  sample  of  insurers,  for  the  period  1992-2005.  We 
evaluate institutional and organizational factors that might explain why claims-made and 
occurrence policies coexist in the marketplace. In our analysis, we apply the traditional 
structure, conduct, and performance paradigm, and focus on the differences between 
insurers using claims-made policies only, occurrence policies only, or a combination of 
the  two  types.  In  particular,  we  evaluate  the  respective  roles  of  organizational  form, 
scale  and  scope  of  operations,  competition,  and  profitability,  among  other  factors,  in 
determining the types of policies offered.  
The remainder of the paper goes as follows. We next present the theoretical foundations 
of the emergence of claims-made and reported insurance contract alongside occurrence 
contracts. In Section 3 we present our structure, conduct, and performance analysis of 
the  line  of  insurance  business  where  the  two  types  of  contracts  are  present 
simultaneously, which is the medical malpractice line.  We conclude in Section 4 and 
offer avenues of future research. 
2. Theoretical framework  
Several veins of insurance research have addressed questions pertaining to the unique 
structure of the U.S. insurance market. The variety of organizational forms, for example, 
has been linked to incentive conflicts and contracting costs (Mayers and Smith, 1988), 
capital requirements (Zanjani, 2007), and advantages in addressing problems in adverse 
selection (Ligon and Thistle, 2005).  The insurer‟s choice of distribution system has been 
related to contracting problems among policyholders, insurers, and agents (Kim et al., 
1996), information asymmetry (Seog, 1999) and impediments to competition (Berger et   3 
al, 1997). Apparently, we encounter a wide variety of insurers in the market for a wide 
variety  of  reasons,  despite  the  fact  that  certain  forms  of  organization,  distribution 
systems, or both, might suggest efficiency gains over the alternatives. 
To say that not much has been written on the economic theory that would explain the 
existence,  in  one  particular  market,  of  two  types  of  insurance  contracts  designed  to 
cover  the  same  risk  would  be  an  understatement.  The  only  published  paper,  to  our 
knowledge,  that  addresses  directly  the  theoretical  underpinning  of  claims-made  and 
reported  insurance  contracts  and  the  reason  for  insurers  to  go  from  the  traditional 
occurrence  contract  to  the  CMR  contract  is  Doherty  (1991).  He  contends  that  CMR 
contracts  were  designed  as  an  answer  to  liability uncertainty on  the  market  that  the 
insurance industry could not diversify. In his discussion of industry trends, Posner (1986) 
suggests  that  insurers  switching  to  claims-made  contracts  were  willing  to  continue 
underwriting  the  risk  of  patient  injuries,  but  did  not  want  to  face  the  added  risk 
associated  with  the  timing  risk  (i.e.,  when  the  compensation  would  be  paid,  given 
potentially  long  delays  in  the  legal  environment)  and  the  corresponding  inflation  and 
investment risks. 
Whereas Doherty (1991) approaches the problem from the industry‟s point of view, the 
theoretical  approach  of  Boyer  and  Gobert  (2007)  looks  at  the  two  policies  from  the 
policyholder‟s point of view. They find that CMR policies are preferable to occurrence 
policies if and only if policyholders discount the future at a higher rate than insurers. In 
other  words,  they  contend  that  the  only  reason  why  CMR  policies  exist  is  that 
policyholders  are  more  myopic  than  insurers.  The  implication  of  this  theory  is  that, 
everything else equal, an increase in the discount rate used by insurers (say because of 
an  increase  in  the  interest  rate)  would  induce  policyholders  to  move  toward  an 
occurrence policy rather than a CMR policy.  
Another possible theory that explains the emergence of the CMR contract from the point 
of view of the industry is that it helps to retain the policyholder with the industry, if not 
with the insurer. Because a CMR contract‟s retroactive date usually goes back only as 
far as the initial uninterrupted CMR contract was purchased, it becomes very costly for a 
risk averse policyholder to jump back and forth from being insured, then uninsured, then 
insured  again.  Similarly,  it  is  extremely  costly  to  go  from  a  CMR  contract  to  an 
occurrence contract because one needs to purchase a retroactive occurrence contract   4 
that covers all previous possible incidents, on top of covering the current ones for all 
future claims filed. 
3. Empirical Analysis 
Our analysis of the medical malpractice insurance industry by contract type follows the 
traditional  approach  in  the  insurance  market  structure  in  that  we  first  present  the 
importance of each type of contract in the U.S. economy as a whole, and the association 
between the contract type and organizational form. 
We then examine several features of market conduct to see if the contract type has any 
bearing on the array of other insurance products that are offered by insurers, the number 
of states they operate in, and the sheer size of their operations. Whether the size of the 
insurer, measured by total assets, is relevant or not in determining the type of contract 
that is offered is also of interest to us, especially when we examine if size is a significant 
determinant of the contract type, or the other way around.   
Finally, we assess the performance of the two lines of medical malpractice coverage by 
looking at the loss ratios, expense ratios, and combined ratios for each year in the period 
under study. Our analysis also focuses on the loss development pattern to see if losses 
develop  differently  in  one  type  of  contract  than  the  other  to  assess  the  difficulty  of 
predicting accurately future losses for the two contract types.  
3.0 The political economy of medical malpractice insurance 
In our assessment of the contract types offered in medical malpractice, we acknowledge 
that a variety of other factors have influenced that the landscape on which the industry 
operates. We focus briefly on those factors that have reshaped the market for medical 
malpractice insurance which may, in turn, relate to contract offerings. 
3.0.1 Medical malpractice crises and underwriting cycles 
The medical malpractice market experiences cycles of hard and soft markets that are 
more  volatile  than  those  experienced  by  property-casualty  markets  in  general, 
presumably because (GAO, 2003) it takes a long time to resolve malpractice claims and   5 
the severity of such claims are highly variable. In the past few decades, three dramatic 
downturns in profitability, and accompanying reports of reduced availability, have been 
called “crises” by insurance and health policy analysts. Crises beget attention, and with 
heightened focus on the health care system, the medical malpractice industry became, 
and continues to be, a prime target for state and federal legislative interest.   
3.0.2 The U.S. Liability System and Tort reform 
Medical malpractice insurers have weathered a variety of changes in their regulatory and 
legal environments over the past few decades. Most recognized, and consequently the 
most  studied,  have  been  a  variety  of  reforms  to  the  tort  environments  in  which 
malpractice claims are brought. These reforms, enacted by state legislatures, include 
caps on noneconomic damages, modifications to joint and several liability, modifications 
to collateral source rules, caps on punitive damages, limitations on attorney fees, and 
allowing for periodic award payments. The intent of such reforms is to restore stability in 
the insurance industry by affecting the number of malpractice claims filed, outcomes of 
claims filed, or both. 
Tort reform measures have been in place in some states for over 30 years
3, while other 
states continue to debate whether any reform is needed, or if particular measures, such 
as caps on noneconomic damages, are consistent with state constitutions. Research on 
the effects of the reforms consistently show that noneconomic damages caps reduc e 
mean payments in medical malpractice cases  (Danzon, 1984; Zuckerman et al., 1990; 
Yoon, 2001), and improved insurer underwriting performance ( Barker, 1992; Born and 
Viscusi, 1998; and Viscusi and Born, 2005).   
3.0.3 Joint underwriting associations and risk retention groups 
Following the first crisis of availability in the 1970s, forty-three states passed legislation 
to allow the creation of “residual” markets to provide medical malpractice insurance to 
high risk medical providers through joint underwriting associations (JUA). Some states 
never actually created these associations, and at least 15 states terminated their JUA 
within a few years. Thirteen states had a JUA in active operation in mid-1985, but only 
10  were  in  operation  in  1996.  Posner  (1986)  indicates  that  because  many  JUA 
                                                 
3 California‟s Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act was enacted in 1975. The Act continues to 
serve as a model for state tort reform.   6 
attempted to set a low ceiling on premiums, they may have pushed out the commercial 
insurers. For whatever reasons, many JUA held a substantial share of the market in their 
states; the South Carolina JUA had over half of the state market share in 1996, while the 
Florida JUA had less than one percent (See Appendix A). While all states with JUA 
require all admitted insurers to participate, some have the additional requirement that 
these insurers provide a particular form of coverage (i.e., occurrence or claims-made). 
Unfortunately,  we  are  unable  to  assess  the  influence,  if  any,  of  JUA  in  the  overall 
medical  malpractice  insurance  industry;  the  premiums  written  through  JUA  are  not 
included in our analysis at this time.  
The  federal  Liability  Risk  Retention  Act  of  1986  encouraged  the  formation  of  risk 
retention groups (RRG) for liability coverage.
 4 The members forming an RRG must be 
engaged in similar activities,
5 such that they are exposed to similar risks . There is thus 
little diversification in the insurer‟s exposure portfolio since all policyholders are faced 
with  similar  risks.  One  final  important  risk-bearing  limitation  of  RRG  is  that  their 
policyholders-owners are not allowed to gain access to state guaranty funds in case of 
insolvency. The Act basically allowed medical care providers, including physician groups 
and hospitals, to obtain more control over their insurance programs. This heightened 
sense  of  control  over  losses  and  premium  therefore  came  at  the  price  of  accepting 
limitations in terms of insurance program scope and in terms of a limited access to the 
formal and informal capital markets.  
The introduction of RRG brings a new type of organization in the market for medical 
malpractice insurance. They resemble mutual and  reciprocal insurance companies in 
that they are policyholder owned, but they have a very limited scope of operations. In a 
sense, we may be surprised that RRG would come to exist since they appear to be 
mutual  insurers  that  are  constrained  to  insurer  only  one  type  of  risk.  What  is  the 
advantage of an RRG so that it could coexist with other policyholder-owned insurance 
companies? There appears to be two such advantages: higher loss control and claims 
management, and a federal statute rather than individual state statutes.  
                                                 
4 There are ongoing discussions in the United States Congress that would extend risk retention 
groups to other types of risk, such as property and personal insurance. 
5 Federal Risk Retention Group Statute, 15 U.S.C. § 3902.   7 
It  is  clear  that  risk  homogeneity  should  enhance  the  loss  control  and  claims 
management abilities of RRG. But this should also be available to mutual and reciprocal 
insurers that could voluntarily limit the scope of their operations. Although the constraint 
faced by RRG is more binding than for mutual insurers, it is nevertheless difficult to 
imagine that it is a sufficient reason to explain the existence of RRG.  
A second more probable explanation to the existence of RRG is the fact that they are 
regulated though a federal statute rather than the states. This federal statute explains 
why RRG cannot access state guaranty funds in the event of insolvency. And although 
RRG were typically formed to meet the needs of a local group of providers, once it is 
licensed, it may enter additional states. As a result many RRG formed in the early 2000s, 
decided to be  domiciled in Vermont due to  the state‟s  particular captive laws,  which 
allow greater flexibility. While regulators generally agree that RRG have helped increase 
the availability of liability coverage, there are some lingering concerns about the wide 
variation in state regulatory practices (GAO, 2005).  
3.0.4 The U.S. Health Care Industry 
As  the  buyers  of  medical  malpractice  insurance,  the  entities  supplying  health  care 
services  play  an  important  role  in  the  determination  of  the  structure,  conduct  and 
performance of the insurance industry. For example, the health care industry has seen 
rapid consolidation, leading to a marked increase in concentration (Gaynor and Haas-
Wilson,  1999).  Through  consolidation,  health  care  providers  become  more  powerful 
purchasers of malpractice insurance.  
3.1 Market structure and contract penetration 
3.1.1. Contract penetration and market growth 
A  primary  component  of  any  study  on  the  industrial  organization  of  the  insurance 
industry  is  the  focus  on  the  industry  structure.  We  present  our  assessment  of  the 
industry structure with an emphasis on the prevalence of the different types of contracts 
in the industry. Table 1 below presents the premiums earned in the medical malpractice 
insurance industry from 1990 through 2005 in total, and as a function of the type of 
contract that was in force.    8 
As we can see, total premiums-earned by medical malpractice insurers has more than 
doubled  during  the  period  1990-2005.  The  annual  rate  of  increase  is  3.49%  for  the 
occurrence  policies  and  5.56%  for  the  CMR  policies,  with  most  of  the  differential 
increase  occurring  in  the  last  four  years.  From  1990  until  2001,  the  average  annual 
increase in premiums earned was the same for the two types of contracts. From 2001 
until 2005, however, the annual increase in premiums earned was 12.75% for claims-
made policies whereas it was only 4.70% for occurrence policies.  
Table 1. Premium earned (in millions of current dollars) in medical malpractice 











Ratio of CMR to 
OCC contract 
earned premiums  
1990  4,150,727  2,915,177  1,235,550  2.36 
1991  4,041,831  2,863,482  1,178,349  2.43 
1992  4,116,903  2,943,184  1,173,719  2.51 
1993  4,298,106  3,116,520  1,181,586  2.64 
1994  4,722,512  3,315,514  1,406,998  2.36 
1995  4,799,522  3,323,055  1,476,467  2.25 
1996  4,878,946  3,436,119  1,442,827  2.38 
1997  5,032,842  3,591,785  1,441,057  2.49 
1998  5,128,893  3,663,239  1,465,654  2.50 
1999  5,267,617  3,675,905  1,591,712  2.31 
2000  5,351,526  3,490,482  1,861,044  1.88 
2001  5,780,544  4,061,636  1,718,908  2.36 
2002  9,157,351  6,726,972  2,430,379  2.77 
2003  8,302,736  5,806,058  2,496,678  2.33 
2004  8,784,556  6,639,518  2,145,038  3.10 
2005  8,629,529  6,563,621  2,065,908  3.18 
2006  10,140,990  7,785,343  2,355,646  3.30 
Annual increase 
1990-2006    7.43%  4.83%   
Annual increase 
2001-2006    16.69%  5.46%   
Source: NAIC Annual Data Tapes – Property and Casualty Insurers, Underwriting and Investment Exhibit. Table 
includes all insurers reporting nonzero premiums in the two types of medical malpractice policies. 
This difference in the annual growth rate of each type of contract can also be seen in the 
fact that the ratio of occurrence total premium to CMR total premium increases during 
the period. There are two possible explanations to having a higher growth rate of CMR   9 
premium than occurrence premiums: either more insured are choosing CMR policies 
over time, or CMR policies are becoming more expensive. 
3.1.2. Ownership structure and contract type 
The  ownership  structure  of  insurers  that  distribute  each  type  of  medical  malpractice 
insurance policies is another important component of the organization of the market. 
Table 2 presents the market share of insurers as a function of their ownership structure 
(stock company, mutual, reciprocal, risk retention group, or other types of ownership) as 
well as a function of the type of contract they sell (occurrence only, CMR only, or both) 
for three specific years: 1992, the first year of our dataset, 1998, the middle year of our 
dataset and 2005, the last year of out dataset.   
Table 2. Market Shares by Ownership Structure, Contract 
Type and Selected years (1992, 1998 and 2006); all insurers 
        
  1992  1998  2006 
Panel A: All Medical Malpractice business 
Stock  58.73%  60.74%  50.42% 
Mutual  23.63%  23.10%  28.65% 
Reciprocal  15.87%  13.56%  14.47% 
Risk retention groups  1.69%  1.62%  6.17% 
Others  0.07%  0.99%  0.30% 
       
Panel B: Claims Made policies 
Stock  58.23%  57.65%  48.92% 
Mutual  20.37%  21.71%  28.06% 
Reciprocal  19.06%  17.38%  15.18% 
Risk retention groups  2.26%  2.16%  7.46% 
Others  0.08%  1.10%  0.38% 
       
Panel C: Occurrence policies 
Stock  59.98%  68.45%  55.38% 
Mutual  31.81%  26.59%  30.60% 
Reciprocal  7.89%  4.00%  12.12% 
Risk retention groups  0.27%  0.27%  1.88% 
Others  0.04%  0.69%  0.02% 
Source:  NAIC  Annual  Data  Tapes  –  Property  and  Casualty  Insurers, 
Underwriting  and  Investment  Exhibit.  Table  includes  all  insurers  reporting 
nonzero premiums in the two types of medical malpractice policies.   10 
Panel  A  of  Table  2  presents  the  market  share  (measured  by  earned  premiums)  by 
ownership structure for the entire medical malpractice insurance industry. We see that 
although stock insurers still cater to the majority of the medical malpractice insurance 
policyholders, their market share in 2005 (50.27%) is markedly smaller than that in 1992 
(58.73%). Mutual insurers as well as risk retention groups (RRG) filled the gap left by the 
departure  of  stock  insurers  as  both  types  of  insurers  increased  significantly  their 
presence in the market between 1992 and 2005. This is particularly true for RRG whose 
market share tripled.  The rapid reduction in the stock insurers‟ market share between 
1998 and 2005 occurred in both types of contracts as we can see in Panels B and C of 
Table 2, but not at the same time.  
Looking at Panels B and C of the table (CMR only and OCC only), we see that the stock 
insurers‟ market share varied differently depending on the type of contract that was sold. 
Indeed, whereas the market share of stock companies did not vary much in the case of 
insurers selling CMR insurance contracts between 1992 and 1998, the market share of 
stock  companies  increased  by  almost  ten  percentage  points  in  the  case  of  insurers 
selling occurrence insurance policies.  
From  1998  until  2005,  the  market  share  of  stock  insurance  companies  dropped  by 
approximately ten percentage points in the two contract markets. We also see,  over 
these seven years, the rapid emergence of risk retention groups as a popular ownership 
structure, especially when the insurance contract is claims made. Whereas RRG only 
occupied 2.26% of the CMR market in 1992, they now cater to 8.23% of the market in 
2005.  
The story is similar in Table 3 when we examine the number of firms selling medical 
malpractice insurance rather than their market share. We see an important consolidation 
of  stock  insurance  companies  that  were  selling  occurrence  policies  as  their  number 
plunged from 239 in 1992 to only 151 in 2005. At the same time the number of reciprocal 
or  mutual  insurers  selling  occurrence  contracts  remained  relatively  constant  with  44 
mutual and reciprocals in 1992 and 1998, and 43 in 2005.  
The most impressive growth in the number of medical malpractice insurers comes in the 
form of risk retention groups. Whereas there were only 10 RRG in 1992, with 5 writing 
only CMR contracts (that is 10 RRG in total with only 5 writing OCC contracts), there 
were 90 RRG in 2005, 69 of which wrote CMR contracts only (that is 90 RRG in total   11 
with only 21 writing OCC contracts). At the same time, the number of stock insurers 
writing OCC contracts only declined substantially, going from 101 in 1992 (284 minus 
183) to 28 (245 minus 217) in 2005. Over the same period, the number of reciprocals 
and mutual insurance companies did not vary much. 
Table 3. Number of Firms by Ownership Structure, Contract Type and 
Selected years (1992, 1998 and 2006)  
  Stock  Mutual  Reciprocal  RRG  Other  Total 
1992             
Any MM Policies  284  33  21  10  7  355 
OCC Policies  239  28  16  5  6  294 
CMR Policies  183  20  19  9  4  235 
             
1998             
Any MM Policies   306  35  19  16  8  384 
OCC Policies  232  28  16  8  4  288 
CMR Policies  231  25  16  15  6  293 
             
2006             
Any MM Policies  222  28  26  102  2  380 
OCC Policies  173  23  23  23  1  243 
CMR Policies  211  27  26  98  2  361 
Source: NAIC Annual Data Tapes – Property and Casualty Insurers, Underwriting and Investment 
Exhibit.  Table  includes  all  insurers  reporting  nonzero  premiums  in  the  two  types  of  medical 
malpractice policies. 
Suppose one were to rank the ownership structure f rom the form that has more risk-
bearing ability to the ownership structure that has the least risk -bearing ability, one 
would  clearly list  the  stock  companies  as  having  the  highest  ability. Bec ause  stock 
insurers can raise extra capital on the market, they are better positioned than any other 
organizational form to compensate for an unexpected catastrophic loss. What ownership 
structure would rank the lowest in terms of risk bearing capacity? We would argue that 
risk retention groups have the lowest ability to absorb a catastrophic loss for two reasons: 
the absence of an internal capital market and the low diversification of their risk portfolio. 
Risk retention groups have little ability to assume a catastrophic loss because a federal 
statute
6 prohibits RRGs from insuring personal lines of insurance, such as homeowner s 
                                                 
6 Federal Risk Retention Group Statute, 15 U.S.C. § 3902.   12 
and automobile insurance. This reduces an RRG‟s ability to profit from any economies of 
scope in providing a full range of insurance services. Furthermore, there is no possibility 
for  policyholders  to  use  their  option  to  access  the  insurer‟s  other  lines  surplus  (see 
Phillips et al., 1998) since there is no other line.  
In terms of risk diversification, the same Federal statute limits policyholders insured by 
risk retention groups to be operating in the same line of business, at least in terms of the 
liability exposure. There is therefore little diversification in the exposure portfolio since all 
policyholders are exposed to the same risk. Consequently, RRG managers should have 
the  hardest  time  raising  capital  following  a  catastrophic  loss  because  there  is  no 
diversification in either the insurance lines not the risk exposure. One final important risk-
bearing  limitation  of  RRG  is  that  their  policyholders-owners  are  not  allowed  to  gain 
access  to  state  guaranty  funds  in  case  of  insolvency.  This  reduces  furthermore  the 
ability of an RRG to gain access to outside funding since the state guaranty fund cannot 
act as the implicit short end counterparty in a put option transaction. 
We saw in Table 3 that risk retention groups are much less likely to sell OCC contracts 
than any other ownership form of insurer. Indeed, only 23% of RRG sell OCC contracts, 
whereas 62% of stock insurers do. Put another way, 77% of risk retention groups only 
offer CMR contracts, a percentage much higher than for any other ownership structure. 
In terms of market share rather than the number of companies, Table 2 showed that for 
the three years that we highlighted, the OCC-to-CMR market shares ratio is the highest 
for stock and mutual insurers and the lowest for RRG and reciprocal insurers.  
In  terms  of  capital  market  access,  mutual  insurance  companies  and  reciprocals  lie 
between stock companies and risk retention groups. Most researchers assume there is 
no significant difference between the two forms apart from the fact that mutual insurance 
companies have a board of directors or trustees through whom business is conducted 
whereas  reciprocals  are  managed  by  attorney-in-fact  common  to  all  subscribers.  An 
outside creditor is therefore able to come to the rescue of a mutual insurance company 
by “purchasing” a seat on the board, but it can hardly do so for a reciprocal. As a result, 
we should rank a mutual insurance company as being slightly more able to access the 
capital market than a reciprocal insurer. We saw in Table 3 that, similar to risk retention 
groups, reciprocals are more likely than mutual insurers to sell CMR contracts than OCC 
contracts. The market shares of these two types of insurance companies in Table 2 tell a 
similar story.    13 
The results displayed in Table 2 and Table 3 support Doherty‟s view that occurrence 
contracts  are  inherently  riskier  for  an  insurer  because  changes  in  the  liability  award 
system cannot be diversified. As a result, stock companies are more present in OCC 
lines than in CMR lines because they can more easily access capital markets to offset 
important catastrophic losses or changes in the legislation. At the other extreme, risk 
retention groups have the hardest time gaining access to the capital market. There is 
thus no surprise to find RRG mainly selling medical malpractice insurance through CMR 
contracts since it is the type of contract for which the access to the capital market is less 
important.  
3.1.3 Concentration ratios 
A third aspect of the market structure of medical malpractice insurance between claims 
made and occurrence lines of business is market concentration. It is well established 
from basic microeconomic theory that a more concentrated market should provide larger 
producer surplus. The insurance market is no different so that we should expect more 
concentrated lines of insurance business associated with greater insurer profitability.
7 
Table 4 presents the top firm market share, the top -4 firm market share, the top-8 firm 
market share and the top-20 firm market share by contract type for 1992, 1998 and 2005. 
Table 4. Industry Concentration (Premiums Earned Market 










1992         
CMR contracts  0.16  0.29  0.43  0.64 
OCC contracts  0.14  0.43  0.61  0.82 
Overall  0.12  0.28  0.39  0.61 
1998         
CMR contracts  0.10  0.25  0.38  0.62 
OCC contracts  0.18  0.45  0.59  0.80 
Overall  0.08  0.24  0.38  0.62 
2006         
CMR contracts  0.06  0.20  0.25  0.55 
OCC contracts  0.16  0.44  0.60  0.82 
Overall  0.07  0.20  0.33  0.56 
Source: NAIC Annual Data Tapes – Property and Casualty Insurers, 
Underwriting and Investment Exhibit.  
                                                 
7 Evidence among lines of insurance is mixed. Bajtelsmit & Bouzouita (1998) find a significant 
positive relationship between concentration and profitability among private passenger automobile 
insurers, while Carroll (1993) finds no significant relationship in the workers compensation market.   14 
For  all  four  concentration  measures,  the  story  is  basically  the  same:  concentration 
decreased from 1992 to 2005 for CMR contracts, but it increased for OCC contracts. 
Overall, combining the two contract types, the top firm and the top-4 firm market share 
decreased between 1992 and 2005, but the top-8 and top-20 concentration did not move 
significantly. Looking in particular at the 2005 market shares, we see that the market for 
CMR policies is a lot less concentrated than the market for occurrence policies. Indeed, 
for the OCC contract market, the top firm, top-4 firm and top-8 firm market shares is 
roughly twice as large as in the CMR contract market. 
A  possible  interpretation  of  why  the  occurrence  market  is  more  concentrated  is  that 
insurance  companies  that  were  selling  only  occurrence  policies  started  selling  CMR 
policies,  thus  eating  away  at  the  market  shares  of  established  insurers  in  the  CMR 
market. Another interpretation is that insurers entering the market were providing more 
CMR  contracts  than  OCC  contracts.  We  examine  this  interpretation  further  in  the 
following two tables where we present the number of entrants in the medical malpractice 
insurance business by contract type (Table 5) as well as the number of firms exiting the 
market, also by contract type (Table 6). 
We see in Table 5 that in the last four years of the data, many more companies are 
entering the CMR contract line than are entering the OCC contract line. This is true for 
insurers that are both completely new to the medical malpractice insurance business 
(166 new CMR insurers since 2002 compared to 69 new OCC insurers) and for insurers 
that were selling the other type of insurance contract (196 OCC insurers started writing 
CMR contracts in 2002 and after compared to 99 CMR insurers that started writing OCC 
contracts during the same period). 
This means that, in the past four years, there were twice as many entrants in the CMR 
line than in the OCC line. Is this difference accounted for by a similar difference in the 
number  of  firms  exiting  each  type  of  medical  malpractice  insurance  market?  The 
following table presents the number of firms exiting by contract type.  
We see that for the last four years of the table, insurers who were selling both types of 
policies were more likely to drop writing OCC contracts while remaining active in CMR 
policies  than  the  opposite.  There  were  80  insurers  who  decided  to  stop  writing 
occurrence policies  from 2001  to  2004  while maintaining  their  CMR  line  of  business 
open, whereas only 66 insurers did the opposite.   15 
Table 5. Entry of firms into medical malpractice lines of business by type of 
contract, 1992-2006 
 
Has not sold medical malpractice insurance 










insurer  new CMR  new OCC 
1992  5  21  23  8  21 
1993  4  8  12  7  12 
1994  21  13  33  29  18 
1995  15  14  25  27  26 
1996  10  22  27  14  24 
1997  14  12  19  22  15 
1998  19  18  33  24  20 
1999  26  25  31  30  27 
2000  18  24  32  20  30 
2001  8  16  24  26  39 
2002  48  28  61  68  34 
2003  42  23  61  49  31 
2004  58  13  61  60  19 
2005  19  5  21  19  15 
2006  23  9  24  10  28 
Source:  NAIC  Annual  Data  Tapes  –  Property  and  Casualty  Insurers,  Underwriting  and  Investment 
Exhibit. The first three columns include firms for which premiums in the previous two years were zero 
(or missing) for medical malpractice insurance. The last two columns include firms that had positive 
premiums in the previous two years, but “entered” the particular contract type in the given year. 
With respect to insurers who were writing only one of the two lines, 53 insurers exited 
the occurrence line whereas 34 insurers exiting the CMR line. Overall, over the last four 
years of the table, the net number of insurers competing in the CMR line increased by 
114  firms  (363  entries  compared  to  249  exits)  whereas  the  number  of  insurers 
competing in the OCC line decreased by 114 (168 entries and 282 exits). We can thus 
say that the new entrants were not taking the place of exiting firms as the number of 
insurers competing in each market went in opposite directions. From 1992 through 2004, 
the number of insurers in the CMR line increased by 30 companies, whereas the number 
of insurers in the occurrence line decreased by 179 companies.  
Whether it is the concentration ratio or the number of entry net of the number of exits, 
the implication is similar: we should expect to observe a decrease in the profitability of   16 
the CMR contract whereas the profitability of the occurrence contracts should have gone 
up with time. We examine this aspect of the medical malpractice market later in Section 
3.3 of the paper.  
Table 6. Number of firms exiting the medical malpractice insurance line of 
business by type of contract, 1990-2004 
  Insurer was writing both types of contracts  Insurer was writing only one 

















1990  11  3  2  3  8 
1991  20  2  1  0  20 
1992  13  9  5  3  9 
1993  16  3  0  3  13 
1994  16  1  1  4  13 
1995  24  1  7  13  11 
1996  25  1  17  2  23 
1997  21  8  8  5  8 
1998  44  10  13  9  25 
1999  69  32  33  32  9 
2000  18  0  2  11  7 
2001  41  23  27  12  8 
2002  20  5  6  9  6 
2003  62  21  30  8  35 
2004  8  6  5  3  2 
Source:  NAIC  Annual  Data  Tapes  –  Property  and  Casualty  Insurers,  Underwriting  and  Investment 
Exhibit, Part 1. The first three columns include insurers whose premiums earned in the current year 
were positive, but premiums in the following two years were zero or missing for one or both contract 
types. The last two columns include insurers whose premiums earned in the current year were positive 
for one type of contract only, but premiums in the following two years were zero or missing for that 
contract type. 
3.2 Market Conduct  
We  now  turn  our  focus  to  the  behavior  of  the  firms  within  the  medical  malpractice 
insurance industry. Entry and exit choices, described above in our assessment of the 
structure of the industry, are just two of many decisions the insurer faces in providing   17 
malpractice  insurance  coverage.  Here  we  consider  decisions  affecting  the  scale  and 
scope of operations, and the main topic of our research: the choice of contract types 
offered.  
Before going into the general analysis of the scale and scope of medical malpractice 
insurance companies, it is relevant to see whether insurers concentrate on one particular 
medical  malpractice  contract  or  do  they  offer  both.  Table  7  presents  the  number  of 
insurers, by organizational form, depending on whether they offer only a CMR contract, 
only an OCC contract or both.  
Table 7.  Number of Firms by Ownership Structure, Contract Type and Selected 
years (1992, 1998 and 2006) 
  Stock  Mutual  Reciprocal  RRG  Other  Total 
1992             
Only CMR contracts  46  5  5  5  1  62 
Only OCC contracts  102  13  2  1  3  121 
Selling both types  137  15  14  4  3  173 
Total  285  33  21  10  7  356 
             
1998             
Only CMR contracts  75  7  3  8  4  97 
Only OCC contracts  76  10  3  1  2  92 
Selling both types  156  18  13  7  2  196 
Total  307  35  19  16  8  384 
             
2006             
Only CMR contracts  50  5  3  79  1  138 
Only OCC contracts  12  1  0  4  0  17 
Selling both types  161  22  23  19  1  226 
Total  223  28  26  102  2  381 
Source:  NAIC  Annual  Data  Tapes  –  Property  and  Casualty  Insurers,  Underwriting  and  Investment 
Exhibit. Table includes all insurers reporting nonzero premiums in one type of contract (“Only CMR” and 
“Only OCC”), and insurers that write both types of medical malpractice policies.  
The impact of the organizational form on the number of different medical malpractice 
insurance contracts an insurer offers is striking. In 2005, only 19% of risk retention 
groups offered the two contracts compared to half of the stock companies, and 70% of 
mutual and reciprocal insurance companies. The fact that risk retention groups are very 
much concentrated in one particular medical malpractice insurance line is not surprising,   18 
given the legislation that allowed RRG to exist. What is more surprising is the fact that 
reciprocals and mutual insurers are more likely to offer the two contracts than stock 
companies. This may be an indication that reciprocals and mutual insurers are seeking 
diversification of their risk exposure through the offering of the two contract types. 
3.2.1 Monoline vs. multiline operations 
In  the  SCP  paradigm,  a  positive  relationship  between  market  concentration  and 
profitability  is  expected  because  firms  have  greater  opportunities  to  collude.  Several 
other competing theories suggest that the relationship between market structure and 
performance  stems  from  other  characteristics,  including  revenue  x-efficiencies,  and 
scale efficiencies.
8 Revenue x-efficiencies result from diversification across product lines, 
where such diversification is driven by market imperfections, such as information opacity. 
Berger (2000) notes that risk diversification by   financial services firms may increase 
revenue efficiency because it improves their offering of outputs of risk -pooling and risk-
bearing.  
Table 8 presents an indication of insurers‟ focus on the medical malpractice lines versus 
other lines of property-liability insurance. Insurers that provide OCC contracts exclusively 
tend to be much less focused on medical malpractice insurance in general. Among these 
insurers, the share of underwriting operations devoted to medical malpractice doubled 
over our sample period, from 9.1 percent to 17.3 percent, with a large increase occurring 
between 2001 and 2002, when the number of firms offering OCC contracts declined 
from 60 to 37.  
In contrast, the firms that write only CMR contracts are generally more focused on the 
medical malpractice line. Through our sample period, CMR business represents 30-50 
percent of these insurers‟ business. Even when the RRGs are excluded from this sample, 
the  share  of  business  in  the  CMR  line  ranges  from  25-46  percent  of  the  insurers‟ 
property-liability  business.  This  is  significantly  higher  than  the  proportion  of  medical 
malpractice insurance in an occurrence-focused insurer‟s entire book of business.  
                                                 
8 For further discussion of these characteristics as they pertain to the property-liability insurance 
industry, see Choi and Weiss (2005).   19 
 
Table 8. Average share of total P/L business in Medical Malpractice* 
(selected years) 
  1992  1998  2001  2002  2006 
Including RRGs           
Writes OCC only  0.091  0.090  0.077  0.151  0.252 
Writes CMR only  0.503  0.310  0.330  0.439  0.727 
Writes both  0.347  0.383  0.328  0.355  0.433 
Excluding RRGs           
Writes OCC only  0.082  0.080  0.065  0.049  0.095 
Writes CMR only  0.450  0.246  0.244  0.277  0.409 
Writes both  0.329  0.359  0.299  0.322  0.383 
Source:  NAIC  Annual  Data  Tapes  –  Property  and  Casualty  Insurers,  Underwriting  and 
Investment Exhibit, Part 1. Share defined as total medical malpractice premiums written / total 
premiums written. *The difference between average shares form “writes OCC only” and “writes 
CM only” is significant for all years shown (based on 2-sample t-test, 99% confidence level).  
Table 9 provides another indication of the extent to which insurers in the market are 
focused on medical malpractice versus other property-liability business. Here we show 
the number of firms that write medical malpractice exclusively. The number of firms that 
write only medical malpractice insurance has increased over our sample period, largely 
due to the entry of RRGs in the latter half of the period.  More firms are writing CMR 
contracts only, and fewer firms are writing only OCC contracts. When we look at the total 
number of insurers that wrote medical malpractice insurance, (356 in 1992, 384 in 1998 
and 398 in 2005) we see that medical malpractice insurance is becoming a much more 
specialized line in 2005 than in the first half of the sample as almost a quarter of all 
insurers in 2005 are only exposed to medical malpractice liability risk. Compared to a 
rate of 12% in 1992 and of 9% in 1998, the rate of 24% in 2005 is a clear outlier. This 
increase in the specialization of the medical malpractice insurance business is mainly 
due to the advent of risk retention groups, but not only so.  
The number of non-RRG insurers that write no other insurance than medical malpractice 
is  much  higher  in  2005,  when  there  are  42  non-RRG  monoline  medical  malpractice 
insurers, than in 1998, when there were only 26. In comparison, there were 351 multi-  20 
line insurers that wrote medical malpractice insurance in 1998 and 304 in 2005. The 
ratio of non-RRG monoline insurers to multi-line insurers is twice as high in 2005 than in 
1998 (14% versus 7%). The results in the previous two tables provide further support of 
Doherty‟s view that OCC contracts are inherently riskier for an insurer, and since the 
changes  in  the  liability  award  system  cannot  be  diversified,  insurers  that  offer  OCC 
contracts must seek other means for diversifying, i.e., by writing other lines of coverage. 
Table 9. Number of firms writing ONLY Medical Malpractice Insurance 
(no other P/L business)* 
  RRG  Others  Total 
1992       
OCC only  1  17  18 
CMR only  4  14  18 
Writes both  3  38  41 
Total  8  69  77 
 
1998       
OCC only  0  16  16 
CMR only  3  13  16 
Writes both  4  20  24 
Total  7  49  56 
 
2006       
OCC only  2  1  3 
CMR only  49  16  65 
Writes both  15  31  46 
Total  66  48  114 
Source:  NAIC  Annual  Data  Tapes  –  Property  and  Casualty  Insurers,  Underwriting  and 
Investment Exhibit, Part 1. Includes only firms with share of medical malpractice business, 
defined as total medical malpractice premiums written / total premiums written, equal to one. 
3.2.2 Single vs. multiple state operations 
The scale efficiency hypothesis implies that firms operating at an optimal scale achieve 
lower costs and higher profits. We evaluated whether the scale of operations is related 
to the types of contracts offered by medical malpractice insurers, first by assessing the 
extent to which insurers are geographically diversified.  Table 10 provides a breakdown 
of insurers by the number of states in which they sell OCC and CMR policies.   21 
Table 10. Number of firms operating in one or more states, by contract type 
  OCC only  CMR only  Both  Total 
1992         
1-2 states  22  19  58  99 
3-10 states  6  11  26  43 
11-25 states  9  7  15  31 
25-40 states  3  1  3  7 
More than 40 states  7  5  12  24 
Total  47  44  116  208 
 
1998         
1-2 states  19  29  50  98 
3-10 states  5  11  43  59 
11-25 states  1  7  19  27 
25-40 states  4  5  19  28 
More than 40 states  3  3  19  25 
Total  32  55  150  237 
 
2006         
1-2 states  5  80  69  154 
3-10 states  2  18  32  52 
11-25 states  0  12  15  27 
25-40 states  1  4  9  14 
More than 40 states  2  7  22  31 
Total  10  121  147  278 
Source: NAIC State Page data. Counts include only firms with positive premiums written in medical 
malpractice  each  year.  *  State  counts  include  the  District  of  Columbia,  American  Samoa,  Guam, 
Puerto Rico, and the American Virgin Islands. Discrepancies with counts in other tables are due to 
availability of State Page data for all firms. 
With the advent of risk retention groups, we see that insurers that are selling occurrence 
policies  only  no  longer  were  able  to  compete  in  single  states.  As  a  result  insurers 
interested in providing occurrence coverage to their policyholders had to diversify their 
risk geographically by selling policies in more states. Whereas less than 10% of insurers 
were selling OCC policies only in 50 states or more in 1992 and 1998, 56% do so in 
2005. The same geographic diversification trend is also observable for insurers selling 
CMR contracts only and for insurers selling both contract types.    22 
Risk retention groups (RRGs) must be licensed in at least one state, but the federal 
Liability Risk Retention Act of 1986 allows them to underwrite risks in other states once 
licensed. Interestingly, more than half of the RRGs providing coverage in 2005 were 
operating in 3 or more states, as we can see in Table 11. Only four RRGs operated in 
only one state, and these offered only claims made coverage.  
Table 11. Concentration of Risk Retention Groups, 2006 
  OCC 
policies only 
CMR 
policies only  Both  Total 
1-2 states  3  55  12  70 
3-10 states  1  12  1  14 
11-25 states  0  10  1  11 
25-40 states  0  1  2  3 
More than 40 states  0  1  3  4 
Total  4  79  19  102 
Source:  NAIC  State  Page  data.  Counts  include  only  firms  with  positive  premiums  written  in 
medical malpractice each year. * State counts include the District of Columbia, American Samoa, 
Guam, Puerto Rico, and the American Virgin Islands. 
3.3 Performance  
Joskow (1973) writes “the notion of industry performance is of course quite ambiguous, 
primarily because of its multidimensional nature” (p.398). This statement is as true then 
as it is now. We will nonetheless examine the performance of the medical malpractice 
insurance industry depending on the type of contract that is offered. This analysis will be 
conducted in terms of underwriting performance of each contract through the use of the 
insurers‟ loss ratio, and the expenses associated with these two contracts through the 
use of the insurers‟ expense and combined ratios.
  
Following Joskow (1973), traditional papers on the structure, performance and control of 
property  and  casualty  insurance  companies  have  usually  included  a  section  on  the 
insurers‟ distribution system and on supply shortages. The NAIC data does not offer us 
any  information  regarding  the  distribution  channel  of  medical  malpractice  insurance 
products, unfortunately. It is therefore impossible to examine with this dataset whether 
CMR contracts are more easily distributed through direct writers or independent agents.    23 
In terms of supply of medical malpractice insurance, we discussed earlier in the paper 
three consequences of supply shortages. The first one is that the medical malpractice 
insurance market experiences hard and soft markets that are extremely volatile, which 
reduces the policyholder‟s ability to smooth his income over time. This is presumed to be 
the result of the particularly long time it takes to resolve malpractice claims and the large 
variation in the severity of such claims. A second consequence of supply shortages is 
that  state  and  federal  legislatures  investigates  and  eventually  reformed  the  medical 
malpractice insurance market through caps on noneconomic damages. Also, forty-three 
states  passed  legislation  to  allow  the  creation  of  joint  underwriting  associations. 
Although some were never created and others were terminated within a few years, 10 
joint underwriting associations were in still operation in 1996 (see the Appendix). Finally, 
a third consequence of supply shortages in the medical malpractice insurance market is 
the enactment of the Liability Risk Retention Act of 1986 by the federal government, 
which encouraged the formation of a new ownership structure in the medical malpractice 
insurance  industry:  Risk  retention  groups.  This  Act  allowed  physician  groups  and 
hospitals  to  obtain  more  control  over  their  insurance  programs.  Regulated  though  a 
federal statute, risk retention groups were typically formed to meet the needs of a local 
group of providers although in time they entered many states.  
3.3.1 Underwriting Performance 
An interesting comparison we can make between the two contracts is with respect to the 
evolution of the insurers‟ loss ratios, as displayed in Table 12. As we can see from 1995 
on, the median loss ratio for OCC policies is consistently lower than the loss ratio for 
CMR policies.  
Prior to 1995 CMR lines were more profitable than OCC lines in four of the five first 
years of our data, the only odd-year out is 1991. Since 1995, the loss ratios of the two 
lines are highly positively correlated with each other (ρ=0.82). Strangely, prior to 1995 
the correlation between the two lines‟ loss ratios is half of that.  
In the previous sections of the paper, we hypothesized that since the concentration ratio 
in the CMR line was going down at the same time as the number of insurers was going 
up, we should observe a decrease in the line‟s profitability, at least compared to the 
OCC  line  where  the  concentration  of  companies  was  increasing  and  the  number  of 
companies was decreasing. Even though the profitability trend is statistically different in   24 
the two lines, both are increasing with time. Moreover, the statistical difference exists 
only  because  of  the  period  prior  to  1995.  After  that  year,  there  is  no  statistically 
significant  difference  in  the  trend  parameter  for  each  line‟s  median  loss  ratio,  which 
suggests that the number of entries and exists and the level of concentration did not 
have much impact on the two lines‟ profitability. 
Table 12. Median loss ratio (losses incurred divided by premiums 
earned) in medical malpractice insurance by type of contact, 1990-2006 







CMR loss ratio 
versus  
OCC loss ratio * 
1990  0.718  0.828  0.719  Yes 
1991  0.914  0.768  0.778  Yes 
1992  0.877  1.000  0.880  Yes 
1993  0.795  0.880  0.840  No 
1994  0.708  0.749  0.666  No 
1995  0.778  0.706  0.717  No 
1996  0.873  0.707  0.798  Yes 
1997  0.770  0.732  0.731  No 
1998  0.775  0.700  0.737  Yes 
1999  0.890  0.795  0.857  Yes 
2000  0.882  0.804  0.848  Yes 
2001  0.874  0.808  0.854  Yes 
2002  0.723  0.678  0.682  Yes 
2003  0.754  0.632  0.725  Yes 
2004  0.695  0.671  0.684  Yes 
2005  0.692  0.553  0.684  Yes 
2006  0.666  0.591  0.681  Yes 
Average 
(1990-2006)  0.787  0.741  0.758  Yes 
Average 
(1995-2006)  0.781  0.698  0.750  Yes 
Source:  NAIC  Annual  Data  Tapes  –  Property  and  Casualty  Insurers,  Underwriting  and 
Investment  Exhibits  and  Schedule  P,  Part  2F.    Table  includes  only  insurers  with  positive 
premiums  earned  in  each  year.  Losses  incurred  include  defense  and  cost  containment 
expenses. *Significance of differences between medians was  determined through quantile 
regression with bootstrapped standard errors. Significance of differences between averages 
was determined using a Two-Sample t-Test.   25 
In light of the fact that more and more premiums are earned in the CMR line than the 
OCC line, one should be puzzled by why insurance companies are flocking toward the 
contract that has the lowest median profitability over the past ten years. We see three 
possible explanations for this result. 
3.3.2 Expenses 
It could be that the expenses associated with managing an occurrence book of business 
are  greater  than  the  expenses  associated  with  the  CMR  contract.  This  is  a  likely 
explanation,  but  unfortunately  unverifiable  for  the  entire  industry  since  expenses  are 
generally not allocated by line of business.  
By focusing only on a subset of companies that mostly (or only) sold medical malpractice 
insurance  (i.e.,  insurers  that  have  more  than  75%  of  their  total  premium  written  in 
medical  malpractice  insurance)  we  are  able  to  assess  the  expenses  associated  with 
offering each type of insurance contract. Doing this exercise suggests that the expense 
ratio (other underwriting expenses divided by total premiums written) is generally greater 
for OCC policies than for CMR policies, as we see in Table 13. Except for the years 
2001, 2002 and 2005, the median expense ratio for insurers writing only OCC contracts 
was higher than the ratio for insurers writing only CMR contracts.  
Another interesting result in the table is that insurers who were selling both types of 
policies had an expense ratio that was significantly smaller than firms that were selling 
only one type of contract (except in the last year of the data). Although this may only be 
a  further  indication  that  there  are  economies  of  size  and  scope  in  the  medical 
malpractice insurance industry, it is still puzzling why insurers would only offer one type 
of contract if they can significantly reduce their expense ratio by offering both types of 
contract. 
We obtain a different view of profitability when we compute the combined ratio (median 
loss ratio plus median expense ratio). Figure 1 confirms that the OCC contract remains 
more  profitable  on  average,  but  its  dominance  over  the  CMR  contract  is  not  as 
pronounced as when we compared the contract-specific loss ratios. It is also interesting 
to note that since 2001, the combined ratio in medical malpractice insurance is lower 
than 1 for both categories of firms.   26 
Table 13. Median expense ratios (other underwriting expenses divided by total 










both types of 
policies 
CMR expense ratio 
versus  
OCC expense ratio * 
1992  0.205  0.333  0.167  Yes 
1993  0.252  0.288  0.164  Yes 
1994  0.256  0.331  0.208  No 
1995  0.265  0.323  0.226  Yes 
1996  0.242  0.280  0.196  No 
1997  0.295  0.337  0.198  No 
1998  0.294  0.321  0.204  Yes 
1999  0.240  0.328  0.225  Yes 
2000  0.274  0.295  0.198  Yes 
2001  0.263  0.257  0.230  No 
2002  0.242  0.223  0.192  No 
2003  0.218  0.309  0.171  Yes 
2004  0.243  0.258  0.172  No 
2005  0.276  0.200  0.208  No 
2006  0.244  0.406  0.196  Yes 
Average 
(1992-2006)  0.254  0.299  0.197  Yes 
Source:  NAIC  Annual  Data  Tapes  –  Property  and  Casualty  Insurers,  Underwriting  and  Investment 
Exhibits. Subset of the data for insurance companies that mostly (or only) wrote medical malpractice 
insurance (more than 75% of their book of business). *Significance of differences between medians was 
determined through quantile regression with bootstrapped standard errors. Significance of differences 
between averages was determined using a Two-Sample t-Test. 
Another possibility is that CMR policies dominate OCC policies for long tail lines, for 
other reasons than insurer expenses. The theory developed by Doherty (1991) suggests 
that occurrence contracts are riskier than CMR contracts for insurers because of the 
systematic risk component associated with court awards. If that is the case, one should 
indeed expect occurrence contracts to generate higher profits at regular intervals until a 
catastrophic event (i.e., an unexpected generous court award that makes jurisprudence 
or a new court decision as to the definition of risk) occurs. It is then possible that the 
medical malpractice insurance market has not suffered such an unexpected shock to the 
liability side of its balance sheet.   27 
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3.3.3 Loss ratio of new entrants 
Earlier,  we  showed  that  entrants  to  the  market  over  this  period  were  more  likely  to 
provide  claims-made  coverage  than  occurrence  contracts.  To  better  understand  this 
trend, we examine the evolution of the loss ratios for the new entrants in the medical 
malpractice insurance market. An examination of this evolution by contract type should 
tell us if there are any short-term profits to be made in the claims-made markets; we 
expect that these profits disappear in the long run. Table 14 presents the reported loss 
ratios for each year after an insurer enters the particular type of contract.  
Selecting only the new entrants in the market, we see that firms that initially enter the 
CMR insurance contract market only have a much better loss ratio than the new entrants 
in the OCC contract market only. The clear domination of the CMR line in the short run 
does not translate into the long run as the CMR loss ratio overtakes the OCC loss ratio 
by  the  fifth  year,  and  remains  worse  thereafter. In  the  first  six years  of  entering the 
medical malpractice insurance industry, the average loss ratio for insurers selling OCC 
contracts  only  remains  approximately  the  same.  This  contrasts  with  the  loss  ratio  of 
insurers selling CMR contracts that increases on average by almost 50% over the same 
six initial years of existence. Assuming that earned premiums remain the same over 
these eight years in the two lines (which means that incurred losses remain the same 
every year for the occurrence line), the two lines are as profitable if losses incurred in the 
CMR contracts increase on average by 10% per year.    28 
Table 14. Median reported loss ratios for new entrants from entrance through 









CMR loss ratio 
versus  
OCC loss ratio * 
1 (initial year)  0.566  0.710  0.660  No 
2  0.681  0.690  0.684  No 
3  0.727  0.750  0.726  No 
4  0.752  0.760  0.783  No 
5  0.730  0.703  0.750  Yes 
6  0.815  0.695  0.763  Yes 
7  0.817  0.681  0.774  Yes 
8 (fully developed)  0.815  0.730  0.768  No 
Source: NAIC Annual Data Tapes – Property and Casualty Insurers, Underwriting and Investment 
Exhibits  and  Schedule  P,  Part  2F.  *Significance  determined  through  quantile  regression  with 
bootstrapped standard errors. 
The  results  of  our  analysis  of  loss  ratios  and  expenses  do  not  suggest  an  obvious 
advantage, in the long run, for an insurer to write one particular form of contract. We 
recognize,  however,  that  the  reported  loss  ratio  may  be  a  bad  measure  of  insurer 
profitability  in  the  case  of  long  tail  lines  of  business.  A  more  accurate  measure  of 
profitability  should  take  the  loss  development  into  account.  For  example,  if  insurers 
systematically under-estimate incurred losses for occurrence policies, using the reported 
loss ratio would over-estimate the profitability of the occurrence policy line of business. 
We address this loss development concern next. 
3.4 Loss development 
Loss  development  is  an  important  part  of  the  financial  operations  of  insurance 
companies, especially in the case of long tail lines. Systematic over-estimation or under-
estimation of incurred losses can cause the insurer problems either from government, 
who  is  losing  tax  revenues,  or  from  insurance  regulators,  who  find  reserves  to  be 
insufficient to cover future losses. A recent study by Grace and Leverty (2007), using 
loss development “error” measures suggested by Weiss (1985) and Kazenski, Feldhaus, 
and Schnieder (1992) finds that firms with a greater percentage of premiums written in a 
price  regulated  environment  are  more  likely  to  over-reserve.  We  therefore  feel  that   29 
comparing  the  loss  development  pattern  of  occurrence  policies  with  the  loss 
development  pattern  of  CMR  policies  can  tell  us  a  lot  about  the  usefulness  of  one 
contract over the other.  
3.4.2. Loss development patterns 
When  insurers  report  losses  incurred  for  a  given  policy  year,  they  have  limited 
information on the actual losses that will ultimately be associated with the policies written 
that year. The figure reported is an estimate that reflects the claims already paid, the 
insurer‟s  own  past  experience  in  loss  development,  anticipated  inflation  and  interest 
rates, and anticipated changes in the legal and regulatory environment. Misestimation, 
which is measured by comparing the reported losses to those restated in subsequent 
years, results from unanticipated changes in these variables.
9  
We are interested in whether misestimation is more or less likely among insurers writing 
CMR contracts when compared to those writing OCC contracts.  To the extent that 
insurers writing either type of policy have information about losses incurred and reported 
within the policy period, loss development for both policy types would reveal adjustments 
solely due to unanticipated inflation and interest rates.  We suspect, however, that the 
misestimation associated with CMR contracts  is lower than that associated w ith OCC 
contracts. By design, loss   estimates  on CMR contracts should result in little or no 
incurred but not reported losses, since the coverage is limited to losses actually reported 
in the policy period. In contrast, OCC contracts may have a significant  share of losses 
that have been incurred, but have not been reported  – possibly because the loss is not 
even determined yet. For CMR contracts, the uncertainty with regard to the effects of 
changes in the legal and regulatory environments is practically eliminated. This follows 
from Doherty‟s (1991) suggestion that CMR contracts were designed as an answer to 
liability uncertainty.   
Figure  2  shows  the  loss  development  patterns  for  CMR  and  OCC  policies  for  three 
policy years: 1990, 1994 and 1998. For each of these three years, the figure shows the 
median  value  of  the  firm-level  reported  loss  ratio  in  each  contract  type,  and  the 
                                                 
9 Several studies (e.g., Petroni, Ryan and Wahlen, 2000) have suggested reasons why insurers 
might  manipulate  reported  losses,  including  avoidance  of  regulatory  scrutiny,  but  Grace  and 
Leverty (2006) suggest that most reserving errors result from true errors, not from manipulation.   30 
subsequent developed loss ratios (developed losses divided by earned premiums). The 
initially reported loss ratio for OCC policies is higher than that reported for CMR policies 
in  1990  and  1994,  and  basically  equal  to  that  reported  for  CMR  policies  in  1998. 
Interestingly, the two types of policies do not necessarily develop in the same way  – 
suggesting a role for factors other than unanticipated interest rates. 
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Source: NAIC Annual Data Tapes – Property and Casualty Insurers, Underwriting and Investment 
Exhibits and Schedule P, Part 2F.  The figure includes only firms that reported nonzero premiums 
and nonzero losses in each initially-reported year (1990, 1994, or 1998). 
 
3.4.3. Reserving errors 
Table 14 displayed previously shows that the median fully developed loss ratio of new 
insurers selling only OCC policies is 0.730. The average median loss ratio of all insurers 
selling OCC contracts over the period 1990-2005 is equal to 0.751. For OCC contracts 
we see that the fully developed loss ratio of new entrants is marginally lower than the 
average  loss  ratio  of  all  insurers  over  the  period,  although  the  difference  is  not 
statistically significant. Interestingly, whereas new entrants offering OCC contracts had a 
lower fully developed loss ratio than established insurers in the market, the opposite 
occurred for new entrants offering CMR contracts. For insurers writing CMR policies the 
average median loss ratio during the period 1990-2005 was 0.795, compared to the fully 
developed loss ratio of new entrants of 0.815 displayed in Table 14.    31 
In both cases, the difference between the two loss ratio measures (fully developed for 
new entrants and the current for all insurers) comes from the fact that the loss ratio is a 
weighted average of the loss ratio of all the insurers, some having more experience in 
the  line  of  business  than  new  entrants.  Because  new  entrants  in  the  CMR  contract 
market grossly underestimate incurred losses early in their lives, as we see in Table 14, 
and that the number of new entrants in the CMR line is quite large (see Table 5), it is 
therefore normal to see an average loss ratio of insurers writing CMR only contracts to 
be lower than the average fully developed loss ratio for that line.  
Returning our attention to the risk bearing ability of the different organizational forms, our 
hypothesis was that stock insurance companies were better able to assume catastrophic 
risks than risk retention groups. A way to measure the risk bearing capacity of different 
insurers is to compare their variations of their developed losses over the first five years 
of the contract by type of contract, as depicted in Table 7. Our hypotheses are firstly that 
stock insurance companies should be better able to assume major variations in reserves 
so that they should be more aggressive in reserving than risk retention groups (see also 
Lei and Schmidt, 2006), and secondly that incurred losses associated with OCC policies 
should be more difficult to predict than incurred losses for CMR policies. Whereas the 
first  hypothesis  is  related  to  the  management‟s  conscious  decision  to  aggressively 
manage earnings (if not manipulate earnings), the second hypothesis is related to the 
uncertainty regarding future losses that come, for instance, from new court awards and 
changes in legislation, factors that are hardly diversifiable.  
To conduct this analysis, we need to construct a statistic that would be correlated with 
reserving errors of insurers in both the CMR and the OCC contract lines. And because 
our focus is on reserving errors rather than the sign of these errors and because of the 
long tail nature of medical malpractice insurance, we need to construct a statistic that 
would take into account all the absolute size of the errors as well as their cumulated 
aspect over many years. This reserving error must also be scaled by the insurer‟s total 
book of business as the larger insurers‟ reserving error could be large in value, although 
it may be small relative to the total size of the enterprise. We shall therefore use the 
following statistic to measure the volatility of the loss development process of medical 








Table 15 presents the results of our analysis by organizational form and by contract type. 
We  see  that  over  the  first  five  years  of  development,  the  organizational  form  that 
appears to be making the larger reserving errors on average is the stock and mutual 
insurance company.  
Table 15. Volatility of loss development by type of contract and 
organizational form, over the first five years of development 
  Organizational form 
  Stock   Mutual  Reciprocal  RRG 


























Source: NAIC Annual Data Tapes – Property and Casualty Insurers, Underwriting and Investment 
Exhibits and Schedule P, Part 2F. Volatility mean  with the standard deviation in parentheses, by 
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The results in Table 15 are in line with our hypothesis that stock insurers have more 
leeway  in  establishing  reserves  because  they  are  better  able  to  access  the  capital 
market when they need. It is also interesting to see that, although mutual insurers and 
stock insurers have approximately the same average volatility of loss development, the 
distribution of this volatility is much more dispersed than for mutual insurers, suggesting 
that stock insurers are more aggressive in the tails. At the other end of the spectrum are 
the risk retention groups, as we hypothesized being the least able to sustain catastrophic 
events and therefore in more dire-need to estimate reserves properly. 
We also see in Table 15 that CMR contract losses are, on average, easier to predict 
than OCC contract losses. This result is apparent for all insurers in general, and for three   33 
of the four organizational insurer types. The only insurer type that appears to have a 
harder time predicting CMR losses than OCC is the mutual insurer type. 
4. Conclusion 
There is little evidence of the extent to which claims-made and occurrence policies are 
distributed over time, across states, or across firms. In our review of the literature we 
noted a general perception that medical malpractice insurers have all switched to claims 
made policies - abandoning occurrence based policies altogether.
 10 One benefit of our 
analysis is to provide an up-to-date assessment of the use of these policies. Although 
claims-made policies may be less risky than occurrence coverage for insurers, since 
they offer additional flexibility for controlling exposure to long-tail liability losses, it is not 
clear that this translates into a higher risk-adjusted profitability. We hypothesize that firm 
and  market  characteristics  jointly  explain  the  use  of  claims-made  versus  occurrence 
policies. While claims-made policies provide an opportunity for insurers to control long 
term exposures, we suspect that certain types of medical providers demand occurrence 
coverage due to the nature of the risks they face.   
We  provided  a  detailed  structure,  conduct,  and  performance  analysis  of  the  medical 
malpractice industry. Focusing on the two distinct types of coverage, we assess changes 
in the market structure from 1992-2005, where we note a significant movement toward 
the CMR contract as well as an increase in the participation of RRGs. Our analysis of 
geographic  and  line-of-business  concentration  reveals  increased  specialization  in  the 
medical  malpractice  line,  but  for  firms  continuing  to  write  OCC  policies  we  note  an 
increase in geographic diversification. Finally, our results highlight differences in the loss 
development, but no robust differences in overall financial performance of insurers who 
resort  to  a  particular  strategy  for  providing  medical  malpractice  coverage.  Further 
analysis of loss development and other measures of performance may help explain why 
one  particular  policy  form  does  not  dominate  the  industry.  In  a  broader  context,  our 
research  establishes  the  contribution  of  an  endogenous,  strategic  decision  –  the 
decision to offer CMR or OCC policies – to the performance of the medical malpractice 
                                                 
10 Recent  studies  cite  Sloan,  Bovbjerg  and  Githens  (1991)  for  a  discussion  of  the  issue. 
Aggregate figures are reported annually by A.M. Best., and are analyzed briefly in Harrington, 
Danzon and Epstein (2006).    34 
industry. The potential influence of this decision on malpractice crises will be the subject 
of future work. 
With the ongoing debate about optional federal charters for P&C as well as life insurance 
companies,  the  study  of  the  impact  on  the  availability  of  insurance  and  the  market 
conduct of risk retention groups becomes more and more relevant. Debate also rages as 
to whether risk retention groups, which are currently limited to writing liability insurance 
coverage, should be allowed to enter the property and other personal lines. The study of 
risk  retention  groups  combined  with  the  use  of  the  different  insurance  contracts  we 
presented in this paper (i.e., the claims-made contracts and the occurrence contracts) 
sheds a light on the topic that had not been seen before.    35 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A-1. Joint Underwriting Association (JUAs) Operations in 1996 
State 








Florida  $1.9  0.5%  JUA writes occurrence policies (2007) 
Kansas  0.7  1.8%   
Massachusetts     
JUA converted to a mutual insurer in 
1990 (ProMutual – 80% market share in 
2004) 
Minnesota  0.2  0.4%  ? 
New Hampshire  5.1  20.3%  JUA insures about 10% of market in 
2004. 
New York  38.7  4.7%  Medical Malpractice Insurance Pool, 
insured about 500 physicians in 2004 
North Dakota     
The North Dakota Medical malpractice 
Insurance Company was established in 
2004 – JUA? 
Pennsylvania  1.2  0.6%   
Rhode Island  5.3  20.9% 
JUA insured about 700 physicians in 
2002 (28% of all physicians, $4M 
premiums) 
South Carolina  12.3  53.4% 
JUA insured about 9000 physicians in 
2004; provides coverage on an 
occurrence basis. 
Texas  4.7  1.6%  JUA 
Wisconsin  2.7  4.0%  ? 
Wyoming     
Medical liability compensation fund 
provides physicians with excess 
insurance coverage. 
 
Source: The Status of the Primary and Excess Medical Malpractice Market and the Future Need 
for the Medical Malpractice Insurance Association, A Report to the Governor and the Legislature 
by the Superintendent of Insurance, New York, Neil D. Levin, Dec. 1, 1997. 
 
 